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Expertise research shows quite ambiguous results on the abilities of experts in judgment and de-
cision making (JDM) classic models cannot account for. This problem becomes even more ac-
centuated if different levels of expertise are considered. We argue that parallel constraint satis-
faction models (PCS) might be a useful base to understand the processes underlying expert JDM 
and the hitherto existing, differentiated results from expertise research. It is outlined how exper-
tise might influence model parameters and mental representations according to PCS. It is dis-
cussed how this differential impact of expertise on model parameters relates to empirical results 
showing quite different courses in the development of expertise; allowing, for example, to pre-
dict under which conditions intermediates might outperform experts. Methodological require-
ments for testing the proposed unifying theory under complex real-world conditions are dis-
cussed. 
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In everyday life, expertise and decision making are inseparably enmeshed with each other. With 
the exception of purely psychomotor areas, we expect that identified experts also make good 
judgments and decisions in their domain of expertise. When our car makes “funny” noises, we 
bring it to an expert mechanic and let him judge what to do. When we feel ill, we see an expert 
physician and let her determine what the problem is and what to do about it. Moreover, it is an 
increasingly common approach in politics, business, non-profit organizations and many other 
areas of public life to enlist expert commissions to advice and help decision makers in their task. 
However, there is a downside to this practice: First of all, how do we know that we are dealing 
with an expert mechanic, an expert physician or an expert consultant? And, even if we are able to 
identify an expert, does he or she really make the better judgments on which we can base our 
decision? The societal relevance of these questions can, for example, be observed in the growing 
unease about the practice of expert commissions in the area of politics and organizations. The 
CSU politician Peter Ramsauer (2000) termed this development “Kommissionitis” (see also 
Leersch, 2001) and laments that “all crucial questions for the future […] are delegated to the re-
sponsibility of arbitrarily composed non-parliamentarian committees. The federal government 
[…] retreats into a moderating role and confines itself to the presentation of expertises and ex-
perts.” (transl.) Recently, Sentker (2008) has commented on the results of an expert commission 
on expert commissions and concludes “Independence? Competence? Transparency? The three 
pages of the guideline to political consulting should become mandatory reading for politicians 
and scientists. So that self-evident demands finally become a matter of course.” (transl.) So, in 
society there seem to exist simultaneously the notion that expert opinions are to be preferred over 
lay or novice opinions and, on the other hand, the fuzzy impression that it is not right to delegate 
important judgments and decisions to experts – especially when it comes to the backbone of so-
cietal life, the rules enacted by politics and enforced by law. This paper will not be able to solve 
this dilemma but we will try to outline an approach that might be useful to remedy some of the 
intriguing discrepancies in research on expertise, on the one hand, and judgment and decision 
making (JDM), on the other. At first, however, we will show that research has come up with 
some of the same intricacies and has yet to deal with the fundamental problems. 
Research on Expertise and JDM 
The most commonly acknowledged definition of expertise is that experts show high, out-
standing, and exceptional performance that is domain-specific, stable over time, and related to 
experience and practice. Additionally, some authors regard the possession of knowledge as an 
essential part of expertise (cf. Sonnentag, 2000). However, the relationship between processes of 
JDM, on the one hand, and different levels of expertise, on the other, has up to now only been 
investigated sporadically (e.g., Chan, 1982; Ebbesen & Konečni, 1975; Önkal-Atay, Yates, 
Şimga-Mugan, & Ötzin, 2003). One reason for this lack of research might be that in the neces-
sarily domain-specific investigation of expertise, JDM is just one aspect of many cognitive and 
affective processes that differ between laypersons or novices and experts. Moreover, it seems 
questionable whether there is something like expertise in JDM outside the realm of a specific 3 
domain. Or, as Yates and Tschirhart (2006) state, there are hardly satisfying answers regarding 
the question how to explain expertise in JDM or how to facilitate the development of such an 
expertise. 
One marked exception to this deficit is Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM), a line of research 
that started in the beginning of the 1990s (Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1993) as a 
deliberate counter movement to traditional paradigms of JDM research. NDM aims at investigat-
ing decision making in the real world. It defines ill-structured problems, uncertain dynamic situa-
tions, severe time-pressure and massive consequences for the decision maker as key factors for 
decisions under real-world conditions (for an overview see e.g., Ross, Shafer, & Klein, 2006; 
Salas & Klein, 2001). Consequently, NDM researches experts like military leaders, fire ground 
commanders or pilots, that is, judgments and decision making in domains in which the above-
named conditions apply. The earliest and probably most influential model of decision making in 
this area is the “recognition-primed decision model” by Klein (1989). It starts with the assump-
tion that experts possess a large repertoire of stored situation prototypes. These prototypes con-
tain the type of situation, what to expect from the situation, suitable goals, typical courses of ac-
tion, and relevant cues (i.e., information that has a predictive power for decision-relevant out-
comes). If a situation is recognized as an instantiation of a prototype, it typically leads directly 
and without deliberation to action because the situation prototype is linked to a course of action 
that the expert already knows will work. However, if a situation is too unusual or too uncertain, a 
sequential mental simulation of particular potential courses of action takes place until a satisfy-
ing solution is found. Every action option is evaluated by itself and in a sequential order – a di-
rect and demanding comparison of options against each other, such as it occurs in classical deci-
sion models, does not take place. As the authors of the recognition-primed decision model posit 
severe time-pressure as a situational constraint, this type of decision making seems plausible and 
empirical studies in respective domains indicate its validity (e.g., for military command and con-
trol officers, see Pascual & Henderson, 1997; for offshore installation managers, see Flin, 
Slaven, & Stewart, 1996; for electronic warfare technicians, see Randel, Pugh, & Reed, 1996). 
Besides the indisputable merits of the NDM approach, it remains somewhat vague because no 
computational model is specified. Therefore, several issues remain unclear, such as the question 
what experts do in new situations and how far experience can be generalized. Do these mecha-
nisms also apply to decision making in complex situations without severe time pressure? 
Another area of research deals with the quality of experts’ decisions and judgments (although not 
identical, both aspects are considered together since only little research deals explicitly with de-
cisions).
2 Shanteau (1992, p. 253) summarizes that “with some exceptions, the judgment and 
decision making literature paints a dismal picture of the ability of experts”. He recaps studies 
                                        
2   Note that in JDM research judgments (i.e., assessment of a decision-relevant aspect) are distinguished from 
(preferential) decisions which often are assumed to additionally entail a commitment to a certain course of 
action and to take into account individual preferences (Yates & Tschirhart, 2006). In this paper, for the sake 
of simplicity and in line with influential related publications (e.g., Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999; 
Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Klein, 1989), we will use the notion decision in the broader sense as selection of 
one out of several options (or a recommendation for the selection of an option) based on probabilistic judg-
ment. 4 
that show expert judgments to lack reliability and validity, probabilistic judgments of experts to 
have deficiencies in coherence and calibration, and experts to make only use of few information 
in a simple linear way (for classic findings, see Meehl, 1954). A well-established explanation for 
this poor performance record states that experts often rely on heuristics, which in turn may lead 
to systematic biases (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). However, research from cognitive 
psychology shows a much more favorable view of experts’ performance. Experts are superior to 
novices in nearly every aspect of cognitive functioning, from memory and learning to problem 
solving and reasoning (Anderson, 1981; Shanteau, 1992). Chi (2006a), Speelman (1998), and 
others report similar dichotomies in reviews of research findings (for a more detailed discussion, 
see below). 
No less divergent than these results are the theoretical and empirical contributions on the ques-
tion of different levels of expertise. A considerable number of terms from simple novice/experts 
distinctions to proficiency scales of up to seven different levels (e.g., Chi, 2006a, in adapting 
Hoffman, 1998, distinguishes between naïve, novice, initiate, apprentice, journeyman, expert, 
master) raises the problematic question of how to measure these different levels (cf. Sonnentag, 
2000). Moreover, theories on the development of expertise vary greatly in their assumptions: 
there are theories proposing a discontinuity in the development of expertise (so-called intermedi-
ate effect, i.e., a decrease in performance on a medium level of experience, e.g., Patel, Arocha, & 
Zhang, 2005; Witteman & van der Bercken, 2007); theories that expect a performance plateau in 
the development of expertise that people can only overcome with deliberate effort (deliberate 
practice by Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993); and theories that assume a more or less 
continuous development of expertise (e.g., Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986), sometimes with qualita-
tive leaps (e.g., Benner, 1984). 
To sum up, although studies in expertise and studies in JDM are fruitful and lively areas of re-
search, a unifying theory of JDM on different levels of expertise is completely lacking. In the 
following sections, we will first outline parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) models (Read, 
Vanman, & Miller, 1997; Simon, 2004; Simon, Snow, & Read, 2004) that, in our opinion, have 
the potential to integrate the different research areas and to act as a framework for modeling 
cognitive processes of JDM on different levels of expertise (see also Spellman, in press). In a 
second step, using existing model parameters, we will discuss findings from studies on expertise 
and derive hypotheses as to how a PCS approach could account for these results. Finally, we will 
discuss in greater detail studies by Witteman and van der Berken (2007), Boshuizen and Schmidt 
(1992) and Schmidt and Boshuizen (1993) on expertise development and outline more specific 
hypotheses concerning the structure of decision networks of experts, intermediates and novices. 
Moreover, we will outline how the PCS approach can account for the seemingly contradictory 
findings concerning decision performance and decision time on different levels of expertise.  5 
Parallel Constraint Satisfaction Models of Decision Making 
Classical theories of decision making imply that decisions are made through a conscious delib-
eration of information (cf. Simon, 1955). It has been repeatedly shown that individuals do not 
always use the mathematically optimal strategy and show systematic deviations from rational 
behavior (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982, 1984; Simon, 1956; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974). Many current models of decision making posit that individuals possess a 
number of information integration strategies of different complexity that are used predominantly 
consciously and adaptively, taking into account specific properties of the situation (e.g., effort-
accuracy trade-off, environmental structure; cf. Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Gigerenzer & Todd, 
1999; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988, 1993). Automatic processing got less attention in deci-
sion research for a long time (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; but see Busemeyer & Townsend, 
1993; Doherty & Kurz, 1996; Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999; Epstein, 1990; Evans, 2008; 
Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1987; Juslin, Winman, & Hansson, 2007; Sloman, 
2002).
3 In contrast to these approaches, the PCS model of decision making (Glöckner & Betsch, 
2008b; for earlier accounts, see Holyoak & Simon, 1999 and Thagard & Millgram, 1995) as-
sumes a primacy of automatic processes and ascribes deliberate processes (only) a supporting 
part for the optimization of decisions (see Figure 1). According to the PCS model, every decision 
starts with the perception of a decision problem. This leads to an automatic activation of a multi-
tude of associated information that forms a temporally activated network (see Figure 2). Once 
this primary network is constructed, automatic consistency-maximizing processes operate to-
wards establishing a consistent interpretation of activated information. Thereby different ways of 
interpreting the decision situation are weighed against each other, and the most probable inter-
pretation is highlighted. This happens by way of a devaluation of information that does not sup-
port the dominant interpretation, and a simultaneous increase in the valuation of information that 
does. The process results in a mental representation that guides decision making. In many every-
day situations, and especially in the decision making of experts, this proceeds completely auto-
matically: a situation is perceived, a completely unconscious mental representation (primary 
network) is constructed and the favored option is chosen (see Figure 1). This process parallels 
the formation of a good “Gestalt” in perception, as already described by Wertheimer (1925, 






                                        
3   Please note that automatic processes were very early considered in research on judgment (Brunswik, 1955; 
cf. Doherty & Kurz, 1996), whereas they were mainly ignored in research on decision making (in the nar-
















Figure 1. Parallel constraint satisfaction model of decision making (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b) – 
process model  
 
According to the PCS model, the automatic consistency-maximizing process in the primary net-
work is at the core of every decision making. This process allows for a fast integration of a mul-
titude of information. Only through this process is an extremely quick understanding of even the 
most complex situations and an adequate decision making possible. For reasons of capacity, an 
exclusive use of deliberate processes would not allow for such a fast reaction (cf. Payne et al., 
1988). Deliberate processes (i.e., conscious reflection) are only employed if an adequate, good 
interpretation regarding the importance of a situation cannot be found. That is, deliberate proc-
esses are activated if the consistency of a resulting mental representation is below a threshold θ. 
Only in that case, a superordinate secondary network is activated that contains potential deliber-
ate “construction mechanisms” which in turn can support the consistency maximization in the 
primary network. Deliberate construction mechanisms in the secondary network are again se-
lected through PCS processes. In the simplest case, conscious processes are used to gather or 
produce (additional) information – e.g., on the basis of mathematical analyses – and therefore to 
enrich the network. Moreover, deliberate processes can be used for a temporal change of the 
network structure, for example to simulate different interpretations of the situation (cf. Betsch, 
2005).  
According to the PCS model, the representation of a decision situation is modeled as a temporar-
ily activated network (see Figure 2). This network is composed of nodes and inhibitory or excita-
tory links between these nodes. Activation is spread through these links, which can differ in 
strength. The nodes of the network represent options and cues that can reach different activation 7 
levels. All links are bidirectional, which means that cues not only facilitate (or inhibit) options, 
but also vice versa. The strength of the relation between nodes is represented by weights. Excita-
tory (inhibitory) links between cues and options represent a positive (negative) prediction of cues 
for options. The general validity node activates the network. The strength of the excitatory links 
between the general validity node and the cues indicate the initial validity of the cues and the 
spread of activation in the network is simulated by an iterative updating function that maximizes 
consistency under the given constraints. A sigmoid activation function is used to simulate 
spreading activation in the network (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; Rumelhart & McClelland, 
1982). This algorithm maximizes consistency and, after a certain number of iterations, leads to a 
balanced state in which activations stop changing. In other words, activation spreads in an itera-
tive process, whereby the activation level of the nodes that represent options and cues is jointly 
modified according to the underlying structure of interdependencies. When a stable activation 
level is reached, it is then compared with the targeted consistency threshold θ (see Figure 1). The 
final activation of the option nodes represents their attractiveness (i.e., individuals’ tendency to 
choose the respective option) and the final activation of the cue nodes represents the a-posteriori 
cue validities (i.e., individuals’ subjective estimation of the validity of the cue after consistency 
maximizing). In the stable state, one option will usually dominate the other options and will be 
highly activated. Cues that support this option will be highly activated, too, whereas cues that 
oppose this option will have a lower activation (for details, see Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b). 
How to Capture Expertise in Parallel Constraint Satisfaction Models 
The different levels of expertise (e.g., Chi, 2006a) could influence decision making according to 
PCS in two ways: They may lead to different mental representations (i.e., differences in the 
structural model, Figure 2) and/or they may affect the parameters of the consistency maximizing 
process (i.e., differences in the process model, Figure 1). Before discussing these differences in 
greater depth we first want to summarize how other decision models might capture expertise. 
Although decision models are usually not concerned with questions of expertise development, 
some of them allow deriving predictions for this process.  Thereby it is useful to differentiate 
between a) multiple strategy models, which assume that individuals select between different de-
cision strategies (e.g., Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Payne et al., 1988), and b) single strategy mod-
els, which assume that always the same strategy is applied but fed with different input informa-
tion (e.g., Brunswik, 1955; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b; Newell, 
2005).  Assuming that people apply different strategies (i.e., following multiple strategy models) 
that mainly rely on deliberate calculations, repeated training will lead to less computational er-
rors and quicker decisions. Furthermore, feedback learning could decrease the prevalence of 
strategies that lead to wrong solutions and increase the application of successful ones (Rieskamp 
& Otto, 2006).  
Single strategy models assume that there is no selection between strategies hence expertise has to 
be explained differently. As stated by the Brunswikian lens model (Brunswik, 1955) and social 8 
judgment theory (see Doherty & Kurz, 1996, for an overview), experience and feedback should 
over time lead to better judgments because people learn how to weight different cues to predict 
specific outcomes (i.e., people might improve their adjustment of cue validities to the structure 
of the environment). Experience could also lead to the development of routines of option 
choices, which are selected in similar situations without further deliberation (Betsch, Haberstroh, 
Glöckner, Haar, & Fiedler, 2001). Similarly, according to the recognition-primed decision model 
(Klein, 1989) with practice in a specific domain people will memorize an increasing amount of 
successful solutions to specific problems which could later on be used to select appropriate ac-
tions (Klein, 1989; see also Dougherty et al., 1999). 
Thus, multiple strategy models would explain differences between expert decision makers and 
novices by more accurate strategy application and better strategy selection, whereas the single 
strategy models explain differences by increasing numbers of stored instances of experience or 
better calibration of cue validities to the environment that are fed into the unique information 
integration process.  The PCS approach allows specifying and extending the later view. 
As introduced above, PCS models follow a single strategy approach and assume that decisions 
are based on automatic consistency-maximizing processes that operate on (different) mental rep-
resentations. According to the model there should be no differences between experts and novices 
in the general mechanism for information integration (i.e., consistency-maximizing). However, 
we argue that depending on the level of expertise
4 there should be differences in the model-
determining parameters and input variables. In this paragraph, we will build on findings from 
expertise research to derive specific predictions how expertise can be captured in PCS models. 
Figure 2 gives an overview along which we will argue. Considerations one to three concern dif-
ferences in the structural model and considerations four to six relate to the process model. 
                                        
4   In research on expertise, one can differentiate between experience and excellence conceptualizations of ex-
pertise. Whereas the experience conceptualisation reckons the length of time working in a domain as an indi-
cator for expertise, the excellence conceptualization looks at the performance of a person in a domain inde-
pendent of experience. The following reported differences are – unless otherwise noted – results from studies 
with both conceptualizations. 9 
 
Figure 2. PCS and its relation to expertise – structural model. 
 
Initial cue validities. First, because of their experience and better knowledge of the domain ex-
perts should ascribe more adequate initial validities to cues than non-experts. This assumption 
rests upon the quite clear empirical results on the adequateness of experts’ knowledge. Experts 
possess “better” knowledge (Sonnentag, 2000). Their knowledge is inter alia more complete 
(Curtis, Krasner, & Iscoe, 1988; Schaper & Sonntag, 1998), contains less incorrect parts 
(Wiedemann, 1995), and is better integrated (Herbig & Büssing, 2003; Herbig, Büssing, & 
Ewert, 2001; Sujan, Sujan, & Bettman, 1988). Very often it exists in a procedural (Sonnentag, 
1998), automated (Schneider, 1985) or implicit form (Herbig, 2001; Wagner & Sternberg, 1985), 
respectively. That is, experts should be able to rate cues much better regarding their validity for 
certain decision options than non-experts because of their markedly bigger and more fitting 
knowledge base. 
Number of cues, interrelation and abstraction level. Second, what information (cues) do experts 
and non-experts collect and use in their PCS network? This question relates to the amount of 
cues and their interrelations as well as to their level of abstraction or integration, respectively. 
Empirical results from expertise research differ between experienced persons, on the one hand, 
and excellent performers, on the other (see footnote iii). Experienced persons usually spent more 
time searching for information while dealing with complex problem-solving tasks than inexperi-
enced persons (e.g., Schaub & Strohschneider, 1992; Voss, Greene, Post, & Penner, 1983). Ex-
cellent performers, however, spent less or the same amount of time on activities of problem 
comprehension than moderate performers (e.g., Koubek & Salvendy, 1991; Schaper & Sonntag, 
1998). At the same time, these results for problem-solving tasks do not generalize to decision 10 
tasks. For example, Kirschenbaum (1992) and Wiggins and O’Hare (1995) showed that experi-
enced as well as excellent performers spent less time on problem comprehension when con-
fronted with decision tasks. However, although experts do not use more time for the collection of 
information, a detailed analysis by Elstein, Shulman, and Sprafka (1978) on expertise in medical 
diagnostics revealed that experts indeed gathered more information in this time than non-experts. 
That is, experts worked more efficiently. In addition, experienced as well as excellent performers 
exhibit a higher degree of knowledge integration and the ability to switch from general, abstract 
information to specific and concrete information while searching for clues (e.g., Bédard & Mock, 
1992; Klemp & McClelland, 1986; Wiedemann, 1995). By means of “scripts” that comprise key 
stimuli, experts can quickly focus on the essential characteristics (Hershey, Walsh, Read, & 
Chulef, 1990). Via this process, large bundles of cues are used as one piece of information. 
There are several similar concepts that may explain the bigger amount of employed information 
in the same or smaller period of time used for the collection of information. These are, for exam-
ple, encapsulated knowledge
5 (e.g., Boshuizen & Schmidt, 1992; Gruber, 1999); the extensively 
proven chunking
6 of information in short-term memory by experts (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973a, 
1973b; Egan & Schwartz, 1979; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; Glaser & Chi, 1988; Lesgold, 
Rubinson, Feltovich, Glaser, Klopfer, & Wang, 1988; Simon & Chase, 1973) and its advance-
ment to the concept of long-term working memory
7 by Ericsson and Kintsch (1995). Taken to-
gether, it seems plausible that the PCS networks of experts represent a bigger amount of infor-
mation that sometimes is more integrated, more abstract and more interdependent than the in-
formation in PCS networks of non-experts. Moreover, experts are able to perceive very subtle 
information and blend them into a whole (e.g., Crandall & Getchell-Reiter, 1993) without being 
able to verbalize how they arrived at their understanding of the situation (Benner, 1984). 
Knowledge of solutions / options. Third, analogous to the concept of objective and subjective 
latitudes in action-regulation theory (e.g., Hacker & Matern, 1980; Oesterreich & Volpert, 1987), 
experts and non-experts should differ in their knowledge of the potential decision options. Non-
experts might only know a portion of the actual existing options and their subjective latitude 
could be smaller than the objective one. Experts on the other side should have a mental represen-
tation in which subjective and objective latitude match. That is, the completeness of knowledge, 
the more precise representation of the domain and the faster retrieval of this knowledge (Alexan-
der, 2003) should lead to the effect that even in automatic processing with PCS experts take (vir-
tually) all decision options into account. To the best of our knowledge, there are no empirical 
studies regarding this question from the perspective of decision making research (except for the 
above mentioned “recognition-primed decision model” by Klein, 1989). However, looking for 
example at the well-documented domain-specific cognitive strategy of „forward reasoning“ (e.g., 
                                        
5   Encapsulation: “…the progressive subsumption, or packaging, of lower level concepts and their relations in 
an associative net under a limited number of high-level concepts with the same explanatory power, which re-
sults from repeated application of knowledge to similar situations” (Schmidt & Boshuizen, 1993, p. 347) 
6   Chunking: In order to circumvent or expand the 7±2 limitations of short-term memory, bits of information 
are grouped (chunked) into larger units. 
7   Long-term working memory: Specialised encoding and retrieval structures allow for the circumvention of the 
“bottleneck” of short-term memory in processing information by storing directly in and retrieving directly 
from long-term memory.  11 
in physics: Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980; in medicine: Patel & Kaufman, 1995), it 
becomes clear that this expert strategy only leads to good results if all options are represented in 
the processing network. 
Taken together, these three influences of expertise concern differences in the structural models. 
However, there could also be differences in process parameters. Specifically, expertise could 
influence the decision threshold θ which determines whether an option is chosen or deliberate 
processes are activated. For the sake of clarity, we will discuss first the influence of expertise on 
the thresholds and how it could lead to overconfidence. Afterwards the related question of the 
activation of deliberate processes will be discussed.  
Decision threshold. As discussed above, PCS mechanisms maximizing consistency in a network. 
The processing of information via the primary network stops if an asymptotically stable interpre-
tation is found. The simulation of this termination of processing can be described mathematically 
as a state in which the activation in the network has not changed in several cycles (Glöckner & 
Betsch, 2008b). Then, the final consistency is compared with a consistency threshold. If the fi-
nally reached consistency lies above this threshold, the option with the highest activation will be 
chosen (if consistency is below the threshold, deliberate processes are activated; see below). 
However, it remains unclear which factors determine the level of consistency (i.e., threshold) a 
person finds satisfactory. Within research on expertise it is conceivable that width of planning 
and goals play an important role in determining which level of consistency is acceptable. Goals 
are at the same time resolve and anticipation, that is, they motivate to act and anticipate the con-
sequences of this action. Against this background, goals represent the relevance of a decision 
which in turn should adjust the threshold of an acceptable level of consistency (e.g., Betsch, 
2005). Results from expertise research show that experts in general work in a more goal-
orientated fashion (e.g., Hershey et al., 1990; Schenk, Vitalari, & Davis, 1998) and that excellent 
performers often prioritize long-term goals (e.g., Hacker, 1992; Hacker & Vaic, 1973). This 
trend can also be found in the area of planning behavior; however, especially in unstructured, 
complex situations experts use a mixture of planning activities (e.g., Leithwood & Steinbach, 
1995), on the one hand, and opportunistic
8 procedure (Gilhooly, McGeorge, Hunter, Rawles, 
Kirby, Green, & Wynn, 1997; Müller, Herbig, & Petrovic, 2007; Müller et al., in press; Visser, 
1994), on the other. Taken together, these results may hint at a higher consistency threshold nec-
essary for experts to make a decision. Moreover, this assumption is in line with another result 
from expertise research: Experts often rely too much on their capabilities and in some situations 
they display overconfidence in their decisions (e.g., Chi, 1978; Englich & Mussweiler, 2001; 
Glenberg & Epstein, 1987; Shanteau, 1992). If experts indeed need a higher degree of consis-
tency in their network before deciding (i.e., have a higher consistency threshold), the finally 
reached attractiveness should differ more between options than with a lower consistency thresh-
                                        
8   In this context the term ‘opportunistic procedure’ describes that experts while solving a problem use every 
possible source of information as a starting point for further proceeding. 
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old. This, in turn, will lead to a higher confidence in the given judgment and a (too) high estima-
tion of related cues validities. 
Initiation of deliberate constructions. There are also results from expertise research that are in-
formative concerning the question when deliberate constructions are activated (i.e., activation of 
a secondary network). Wagner and Sternberg (1985) (see also Büssing, Herbig, & Ewert, 2001) 
demonstrated that experts have more procedural and more implicit knowledge (in the sense of 
tacit knowledge Polanyi, 1966). This in turn might indicate that it takes more time for experts to 
initiate deliberate constructions because the adequate and pronounced automatic processes “as-
sert” themselves. Conversely, the same study showed that not only domain-specific knowledge 
differs between good and poor performers, but also those parts of procedural knowledge that re-
late to metacognition and self-regulation. Moreover, it is a well documented fact that experts in 
general hold more metacognitive knowledge than non-experts (e.g., Chi, Glaser & Rees, 1982; 
Eteläpelto, 1993; Lind & Sandmann, 2003; Sonnentag, 1998). More declarative and more proce-
dural meta-knowledge then might lead to a lower threshold for initiating deliberate constructions 
in experts. That is, experts should have a better understanding of their own automatic processes 
so that difficult and unsuccessful consistency-maximizing processes could be aborted at an ear-
lier time. 
Taken together, from a PCS perspective, differences between experts and non-experts in situa-
tions with complex informational states can be summed up as follows: 
•  In real-world situations, PCS networks of experts should contain more and/or other cues 
as well as more and/or other options than the PCS networks of non-experts. 
•  Cues in the PCS networks of experts have a higher level of aggregation regarding the or-
ganizing principle of content as well as regarding the size of chunks. 
•  Initial cue validities are more adequate in experts’ PCS networks than in networks of 
non-experts. 
Since it is not quite clear which background variables do exert an influence (goals, procedural 
knowledge, metacognition, amongst others), we assume on a weaker theoretical basis: 
•  The threshold for stopping the consistency-maximizing primary process should be higher 
for experts than for non-experts. That is, experts should require a higher consistency in 
their network before coming to a decision. 
•  At the same time, the threshold for initiating deliberate constructions, that is, the con-
struction of a secondary network, should be lower for experts than for non-experts, mean-
ing that experts should start deliberate processing earlier than non-experts. 
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Up to now, we looked at differences between experts and non-experts. In the next section, we 
will describe in greater detail how PCS can account for findings concerning different develop-
mental stages of expertise (i.e., novices, intermediates and experts). 
Novices, Intermediates and Experts – Decision Making on Different 
Levels of Expertise 
As outlined above, theories on the development of expertise vary greatly in their assumptions on 
performance on different stages of expertise. One puzzling problem seems to appear at an inter-
mediate level of expertise. In studies contrasting novices, persons at an intermediate level of ex-
pertise, and experts, some researchers find a decrease in performance on a medium level; that is, 
intermediates perform worse than experts and novices (e.g., Patel, Evans, & Groen, 1989; Wit-
teman & van der Bercken, 2007), whereas others show intermediates doing better than novices 
and experts (e.g., Schmidt & Boshuizen, 1993) (for a discussion of these divergent results on the 
so-called ‘intermediate effect’, see, for example, Williams & Noyes, 2007). To consider reasons 
for these differences in terms of PCS models we will first sketch three of the respective studies. 
Witteman and van der Bercken (2007) studied the assessment performance of psychodiagnosti-
cians in ten written and abbreviated cases from the DSM-IV case book (Frances & Ross, 2001). 
The participants were required to give the DSM diagnostic classification. The authors differenti-
ated theoretically and empirically between novices with zero to one year of experience, interme-
diates with up to 17 years’ experience and very experienced clinicians (experts) with 18 years 
and upwards of experience. Witteman and van der Bercken argue that the very broad range of 
intermediates was used to mirror the fact that diagnostic classification is only a subtask in clini-
cal practice, therefore not occurring as often as other tasks, which in turn should lead to less ex-
perience with this task. The cut-off value of 18 years represents the doubling of the conventional 
“expertise value” of nine to ten years in a certain domain (e.g., Feltovich, Prietula, & Ericsson, 
2006). As expected, the authors found an intermediate effect in the numbers of correct classifica-
tions: A cubic function fitted the data best. Intermediates performed worse than both novices and 
experts. However, one unexpected result occurred: looking at decision times, intermediates were 
significantly faster than both novices and very experienced clinicians. The authors tentatively 
interpret this as a result of the experts being aware of potential complexities and more possible 
diagnoses than intermediates, thus needing longer to think about diagnostic questions. 
In studies undertaken in the domain of medicine, Boshuizen and Schmidt (1992) explored the 
role of biomedical knowledge on the diagnosis of clinical cases and assessed the effect of differ-
ent levels of expertise on clinical case recall (Schmidt & Boshuizen, 1993). In their first study, 
they classified the four participants from novice (2
nd-year medical student), intermediate 1 (4
th-
year medical student, nearly finished with preclinical training), intermediate 2 (5
th-year medical 
student, finished with internships in primary care and internal medicine) to expert (family physi-
cian with four years of experience). The task was to think aloud while being sequentially pre-
sented with information on a clinical case and to deliver a differential diagnosis at the end. The 14 
thinking-aloud protocols were then segmented into propositions which were coded as either 
biomedical or clinical. Results showed a monotonous decrease in the application of biomedical 
knowledge from over 50% in the novice’s protocol to less than 10% in the expert’s protocol. 
Boshuizen and Schmidt (1992) argued that three different explanations for this might be possi-
ble: First, with growing expertise biomedical knowledge becomes rudimentary; second, bio-
medical knowledge becomes inert, and third, in the development toward expertise biomedical 
knowledge becomes encapsulated in clinical knowledge. To test for these explanations, in a sec-
ond experiment 20 participants in the respective levels of expertise completed the task from 
study 1 but were additionally asked to describe in writing the pathophysiological processes un-
derlying the case. In data analysis, think-aloud propositions and post-hoc propositions were 
matched and the relation between the matched arguments classified as either identical or abbre-
viated. Results showed that the application of biomedical knowledge in the course of expertise 
development first increases and later decreases again. That is, in contrast to Witteman and van 
der Bercken (2007), an inverted U-shaped function was found. Moreover, the authors were able 
to demonstrate that this decrease from intermediate to expert level was not due to decay or iner-
tia but to the encapsulation of biomedical knowledge in clinical knowledge. In a second set of 
studies, Schmidt and Boshuizen (1993) tested for an intermediate effect that also consistently 
produced an inverted U-shape form across expertise levels: The free recall of case relevant mate-
rials (e.g., Claessen & Boshuizen, 1985; Muzzin, Norman, Feightner, & Tugwell, 1983). Ex-




medical students as different level intermediates, and internists with at least 2 years of experi-
ence as experts). Subjects had to read case materials under three different time constraints, recall 
the information and give a diagnosis. Although the number of accurate diagnosis covaried sig-
nificantly with expertise and processing time had an overall effect on diagnostic accuracy, the 




th-year medical students (intermediates) recalled considerable more case information 
than laypersons and experts. In experiment 2, 80 persons participated from the same subgroups 
as in experiment 1. With a priming paradigm, prior knowledge was either partially or fully acti-
vated. Again, diagnostic performance was strongly linearly related to expertise and a significant 
cubic intermediate effect on recall was found. Moreover, Schmidt and Boshuizen (1993) could 
demonstrate that among students, the free recall of a clinical case is causally determined by the 
amount of activation of pathophysiology knowledge, whereas among clinicians it is not. In light 
of their different experiments, the authors conclude that superior diagnostic performance of ex-
perts cannot be explained by a more extensive processing of a case but is based on knowledge 
structures that are qualitatively different from those of advanced students, namely, encapsulated 
knowledge. In addition, the results from free recall showed that experts subsumed a lot more 
propositions in encapsulated form than intermediates and were therefore able to use most of the 
case information without actually verbalizing it. 
Taken together, the results from Witteman and van der Bercken (2007), Boshuizen and Schmidt 
(1992) and Schmidt and Boshuizen (1993) reveal some interesting features of intermediate and 
expert performance (although one has to bear in mind that the respective subgroups of expertise 15 
were operationalized quite differently). First of all, Witteman and van der Bercken (2007) found 
a disadvantage of intermediates over novices and experts in psychodiagnostic classification, 
whereas the latter authors found a linear positive relationship between diagnostic accuracy and 
expertise. Secondly, intermediates in the Witteman and van der Bercken study were significantly 
faster in their decisions than both novices and very experienced clinicians. In the study from 
Schmidt and Boshuizen (1993), the experimentally manipulated processing time of case material 
led to a significant quadratic effect of expertise; that is, with a longer processing time intermedi-
ates recalled a higher number of propositions than both the novices and experts. Moreover, the 
recall performance of experts was not affected by different processing times. And, last but not 
least, processing time did not influence the positive linear relationship between diagnostic accu-
racy and expertise. Actually, experts performed even better under high time constraints, although 
this effect did not reach significance. 
Against the background of these findings, a model of decision making on different levels of ex-
pertise has to be able to account for the obviously contradicting effects that intermediates some-
times perform a) worse than novices and experts, b) better than novices but worse than experts or 
c) better than novices and experts. Furthermore, such a model has to explain why novices and 
intermediates are sensitive to time constraints but experts are not. Correspondingly, a model on 
decision making and expertise has to be able to explain the differences between different levels 
of expertise and it has to be able to predict under which circumstances which type of difference 
will occur. According to the classic decision models introduced above, there should be a mono-
tonically increasing performance and decreasing decision time with increasing level of expertise. 
With growing experience, individuals should select and apply strategies quicker and with fewer 
errors (cf. Payne et al., 1988); they should select more appropriate strategies (Gigerenzer & 
Todd, 1999; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006); there should be more prototypes which (under the as-
sumption of representative sampling) will provide better, more differentiated and quicker solu-
tions to decision problems (Klein, 1989) and finally the calibration of cue usage to the cue valid-
ities in the environment should improve (Doherty & Kurz, 1996). Thus, these decision models 
can only account for findings with intermediates being better than lay persons but worse than 
experts (i.e., (b)). In contrast, as we already suggested, the presented PCS model is able to ac-
count for the more differentiated findings. We will outline this claim in the following, based on 
the PCS experts - hypotheses derived above.   
The main source of differences between novices, intermediates and experts is the mental repre-
sentations underlying their decisions. Figure 3 depicts a grossly simplified picture of the poten-
tial differences in these networks. Based on the empirical results regarding information search in 
novices and experts, we propose that the networks of experts contain more cues than the net-
works of intermediates, which in turn contain more cues than the networks of novices. Moreover, 
experts’ networks include links of different strength between cues (interdependencies), whereas 
networks of intermediates and novices do not. In addition, experts’ and intermediates’ networks 
comprise cues for different options, whereas the cues in the network of novices strongly support 
one option. And, finally, due to the differences in background knowledge and experience, the 16 
initial cue validities vary between the three groups. The sketchy representation in Figure 3 high-
lights the prominent point of divergence in the results of intermediate performance: 
 
Figure 3. Schematized representation of parts of the PCS model for experts, intermediates and 
novices (strength of lines = size of cue validities resp. strength of interdependency). 
 
Depending on the accuracy of the initial cue validity, intermediates might reach correct decisions 
quite fast; but, even more importantly, performance that requests the recall of single units of in-
formation is likely to be good to very good for intermediates as they know enough about the do-
main to structure the information, but have not yet developed interrelating links between cues. 
Moreover, the knowledge base of intermediates should contain a lot of theoretical knowledge 
that is not yet integrated with experience-based knowledge. Under certain circumstances, for in-
stance when a problem can be represented adequately by means of everyday knowledge, this in 
turn might lead to inferior performance even in comparison to novices or lay persons. Experts on 
the other side should store (and use) information in a chunked form (see, e.g., Chase & Simon, 
1973a, 1973b; Egan & Schwartz, 1979; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; Glaser & Chi, 1988; Les-
gold et al., 1988; Simon & Chase, 1973; in terms of Schmidt & Boshuizen, 1993: encapsulated 
knowledge), which might bring about worse performance in the recall of single units. This dis-
advantage, however, turns into an advantage under time constraints: Due to the interdependen-
cies of cues, experts might be able to process a whole lot more information in the same time pe-
riod novices and intermediates need to handle only a few cues. Chunking of information, as evi-
denced in experts’ performance, might function in the case of parallel constraint satisfaction 
processing analogously to the “constrained basic-level malleability view” proposed by Johnson 
and Mervis (1997) in the area of categorization. These authors demonstrated that in the course of 17 
expertise development the universal basic level of categorization might shift to more specific 
sub-basic levels without losing its privileged status. These shifts depend on acquired knowledge, 
goals and domain and therefore allow for different categorizations in different situations. Along 
these lines, it seems plausible that chunks in experts PCS networks can take on different forms: 
They may act as a single processing unit, may play the role of gateway to highly interconnected 
background knowledge, or may still function as separate information units exhibiting or inhibit-
ing each other depending on task constraints. 
Taken together, the differences in structure and content of the PCS network determines the per-
formance in decision making of novices, intermediates and experts. To investigate the proposed 
hypotheses empirically, a number of methods might be necessary. For instance, to understand 
which information is searched for and used on different levels of expertise, a nonreactive method 
like Active Information Search (Huber, 2007; Huber & Huber, 2008; Huber, Wider, & Huber, 
1997) or Eye Tracking (e.g., Pomplun, Richter, & Velichkovsky, 1996) might be useful; to make 
the chunks of experts accessible free recall (e.g., Chi, 2006b; Hoffman, 1987; Hoffman, Shad-
bolt, Burton & Klein, 1995) as an established method in memory research could be useful; and to 
get a first glimpse at the underlying mental representation, methods for the elicitation and expli-
cation of knowledge (e.g., Büssing & Herbig, 2003; Gaines & Shaw, 1993) could be employed. 
We intend to use a combination of these methods in forthcoming research. 
Discussion 
Expertise research shows quite differentiated or even contradicting results on the abilities of nov-
ices, intermediates and experts in general, as well as on their performance in decision making 
tasks specifically. A unifying theory of decision making has to be able to account for these find-
ings. Classic models of decision making, such as the multiple- and single-strategy models out-
lined above, are based on learning mechanisms and would predict (more or less) monotonic in-
creases in decision making performance. However, this prediction is at odds with the results 
from expertise research. We could show that another approach to decision making, PCS, which 
also postulates a single strategy model (namely, processes of automatic consistency maximiz-
ing), is much better prepared to explain the puzzling results. However, a caveat is necessary: Al-
though we propose differences in the structure of the primary networks of people on different 
levels of expertise, current PCS models do not explain the development of these mental represen-
tations in the course of expertise. Other theories might be better equipped to do so (e.g., Ander-
son, 1992; Anderson, Matessa & Lebiere, 1997; for an overview see Hatano & Inagaki, 2000). 
Nevertheless, as we aimed to show, they provide a useful framework to model the difference in 
decision making given existing differences in mental representations.  
Although the literature overview, the outlined PCS model, and the proposed hypotheses are first 
steps towards a unifying theory of decision making on different levels of expertise, a lot of em-
pirical testing has to be done before an evaluation of the proposed model can take place. One of 
the most important questions in this research will be how to deal with the complexity of real-18 
world decision situations. As outlined by Glöckner and Betsch (2008b) it is possible to simulate 
some of the core assumptions with networks basing on the algorithm by McClelland and Rumel-
hart (1981). However, this will only be a starting point for tracing the potential complexity faced 
by every one of us each day.  
The parallel constraint satisfaction approach provides an alternative to current interpretations of 
the bounded rationality approach (Simon, 1955; 1982) which assume that people use mainly 
simplifying strategies to reduce complexity while still reaching comparably good decisions (Gig-
erenzer & Todd, 1999).  In contrast to this view, findings indicate that the majority of people 
make decisions that follow a complex weighted compensatory integration of information (e.g., 
Bröder, 2003; Glöckner, 2007) and are based on automatic processing (Glöckner & Betsch, 
2008a; 2008c). Performance of experts in complex situations (e.g., Ericsson, Charness, Hoffman, 
& Feltovich, 2006; Sonnentag, 2000 for an overview), too, suggests that in real world situations 
more complex decision strategies are used, but these proceed often automatically, unconsciously 
or implicitly and therefore bypass an overload of the cognitive system (Glöckner, 2008; Herbig, 
2001). Representative and ecologically valid situations (e.g., Winkel, 1987) from the respective 
domains of expertise are necessary if one attempts to understand the processes that allow nov-
ices, intermediates and experts to deal with the vast amount of information and knowledge nec-
essary to make a decision (cf. Ericsson & Charness, 1994; Shanteau, 1992). 
Getting back to the question, raised at the beginning, whether ”Kommissionitis“ is a good thing 
or a bad thing, the answer regarding decision making might be “it depends”. On the basis of 
theoretical assumptions of parallel constraint satisfaction models and the empirical results of ex-
pertise research, it seems reasonable to assume that experts indeed make better judgments and 
decisions than lay persons most of the time. However, looking at an intermediate level of exper-
tise this assumption becomes somewhat less unambiguous. The degree to which the mental mod-
els capture reality should differ between novices, intermediates and experts. Yet, in order to gain 
an understanding of the contents of these models qualitative research is necessary in addition to 
the aforementioned testing of hypotheses. A combination of those methods permits not only con-
clusions about the proposed model-inherent differences but – together with characteristics of the 
decision task, the decision itself and its quality – also a first approach to socio-political relevant 
themes. This could, for example, be improvements in the training of professional decision mak-
ers or even changes in organizational structures or procedures to ensure optimal conditions for 
decision making. Moreover, the results of such an approach would help to predict under which 
circumstances experts make good decisions and under which conditions novices and/or interme-
diates also reach good or even better decisions. Thus, different methodological approaches will 
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